ReDigi and the Volitional Conduct Element

While much is being written about the Capitol Records v. ReDigi memorandum and order that came out a few days ago, I want to focus on a bit of the opinion that caught my eye that (to my knowledge) no one else has mentioned. The court found that ReDigi—the service provider—had the requisite volitional conduct to hold it directly liable for copyright infringement even though its users were the ones who ultimately “pressed the button” and caused the copies to be made. This, as discussed below, is a rather remarkable result given the state of the law in the Second Circuit where the district court sits.

By way of background, Terry Hart at the Copyhype blog has a great write-up about ReDigi here. Defendant ReDigi operates a service wherein the public can buy and sell “used” digital music files. Plaintiff Capitol filed a complaint alleging that ReDigi violated its federal and common law copyrights. As to its federal claims, Capitol averred that ReDigi was directly liable for violation of its reproduction, distribution, public display, and public performance rights. It also maintained that ReDigi was indirectly liable for violation of its reproduction, distribution, and public display rights on theories of inducement, contributory, and vicarious infringement.

Capitol filed a motion for preliminary injunction and a memorandum of law in support. Google even tried to get in on the action, seeking leave of the court to file a brief as amicus curiae. The court denied the request, finding that “the parties are fully capable of raising these issues themselves—and have every incentive to do just that.” In a one-page order, Judge Richard J. Sullivan denied Capitol’s motion for preliminary injunction, incorporating his reasons as stated in the motion hearing by reference. The court found that in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in eBay and the Second Circuit’s opinion in Salinger, “the lack of irreparable harm . . . really is the issue that causes me to deny the motion. It seems to me that money damages should be able to take care of all of this.” In the court’s opinion, since ReDigi kept records of the transactions that took place on its site, “there would be a record from which to calculate damages.”

Several months later, Capitol filed a motion for partial summary judgment, limiting its focus to infringement of the reproduction and distribution rights under federal copyright law. On the same day, ReDigi filed its own motion for summary judgment, asking the court to dismiss the claims against it. Public Knowledge, like Google before, tried to get in on the action, and it sought leave of the court to file a brief in support of ReDigi as amicus curiae. The court rejected the request, again stating that the parties were capable of addressing the issues themselves. After the briefing on the cross-motions for summary judgment was completed, the court held a hearing on the motions (which, by the way, is pretty funny and worth a read). Its memorandum and order on these motions is what came out a few days ago.

The Volitional Conduct Element

Copyright infringement is said to be a strict liability tort, meaning that intent to infringe is not a necessary element to establish a prima facie case of direct infringement.1 While noting that “[d]irect infringement does not require intent or any particular state of mind,” the district court in the seminal Netcom case held that “there should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.”2 Important to the court’s analysis was the fact that the service provider “did not take any affirmative action that directly resulted in copying plaintiffs’ works other than by installing and maintaining a system whereby software automatically forwards messages received” from its subscribers.3

It was Netcom’s subscribers who “initiated the copying” using its equipment that could “operate without any human intervention.”4 Even though Netcom’s system “incidentally makes temporary copies of plaintiffs’ works,” said the court, it does not necessarily follow that the service provider “has caused the copying.”5 Thus, absent “some element of volition or causation,” the district court held that “the storage on a defendant’s system of infringing copies and retransmission to other servers is not a direct infringement” by the service provider “where such copies are uploaded by an infringing user.”6 The court noted that holding Netcom directly liable for the actions of its subscribers would mean holding “the entire Internet liable for activities that cannot reasonably be deterred.”7

The Netcom decision was followed by the Fourth Circuit in CoStar, wherein the court stated that direct infringement implies “a requirement of volition or causation by the purported infringer.”8 “While the Copyright Act does not require that the infringer know that he is infringing or that his conduct amount to a willful violation of the copyright owner’s rights,” said the court, “it nonetheless requires conduct by a person who causes in some meaningful way an infringement.”9 According to the court, it takes more than mere ownership of a machine used by others to establish direct liability: “There must be actual infringing conduct with a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying that one could conclude that the machine owner himself trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.”10

The court of appeals stated that “Netcom made a particularly rational interpretation of § 106 when it concluded that a person had to engage in volitional conduct—specifically, the act constituting infringement—to become a direct infringer.”11 The court, following Netcom, held that “the automatic copying, storage, and transmission of copyrighted materials, when instigated by others, does not render an ISP strictly liable for copyright infringement” under the Copyright Act.12 Thus, the Fourth Circuit further cemented into law the rule that a service provider that has no control over whether the copying of particular materials occurs cannot be directly liable for infringement.

In the famous Cablevision case,13 the Second Circuit considered whether defendant Cablevision could be a direct infringer by supplying its customers with a remote storage digital video recorder system. The district court below had held that it could, finding that it was Cablevision, and not its customers, that caused the copies to be made. The Second Circuit reversed, citing the Netcom and CoStar opinions and noting that those courts had quite reasonably read a volitional conduct element into what would otherwise be a strict liability statute. The court of appeals stated that when there is question as to which party is causing a copy to be made, courts should direct their “attention to the volitional conduct that causes the copy to be made.”14

The Second Circuit noted that there were two sets of volitional acts. First, Cablevision had designed, housed, and maintained the system used to produce the copies, and second, the customers had requested the system to create the copies. The court likened Cablevision’s customers to users of a traditional VCR, and it held that it would be perverse to make Cablevision accountable “for copies that are made automatically upon [a] customer’s command.”15 Just like the provider of a VCR would not be directly liable for the copies its customers cause, reasoned the court, so too was Cablevision not directly liable for the copies its customers would cause—notwithstanding Cablevision’s own contributions to the copying and its complete control over the use of its system.

Cablevision’s actions were far more proximate to the copying of particular materials than Netcom’s or the CoStar defendant’s ever were, and the rule from Netcom has been extended significantly past relieving mere passive conduits of liability for direct infringement. This leads to the potentially nefarious situation where no matter how instrumental a service provider’s actions may be in causing the unauthorized copying of particular materials—such as by Cablevision (1) supplying its customers with the source materials and the tools for the job, (2) making the copying as simple as pressing a virtual button, and (3) maintaining complete control over every aspect of its dedicated copy machine that existed for no purpose other than to make particular copies—that service provider would not be a direct infringer.

The precedent set by the foregoing cases indicates that no matter how many steps a service provider actually takes in helping its customers commit copyright infringement, it will not be held liable as a direct infringer so long as its customers initiate the very last step. That’s why it’s so remarkable that the district court here in Capitol Records v. ReDigi found ReDigi to be liable as a direct infringer. So how did the district court get past this precedent to find that ReDigi had engaged in the volitional conduct necessary to hold it directly liable for copyright infringement?

The Parties’ Arguments

In its memorandum of law in support of its motion for partial summary judgment, Capitol argued that ReDigi “engaged in ‘volitional conduct’ that transcends acting as a mere ‘passive conduit’ for the infringement of works selected by its users . . . .” Capitol adduced that ReDigi selected and screened each music file that was uploaded to its system, actively participating with its users in the infringing acts and encouraging them to utilize its service. This “level of intervention, oversight and encouragement,” urged Capitol, “plainly constitutes volitional conduct under the governing case law.” Capitol claimed that by goading its users to upload infringing files over which it had individualized control, ReDigi was more than a mere passive service provider.

In its memorandum of law in opposition to Capitol’s motion for partial summary judgment, ReDigi averred that even if “reproduction occurred during the upload process, ReDigi cannot be liable as a direct infringer as it has not engaged in ‘volitional conduct.’” It reasoned that under the Second Circuit’s holding in Cablevision, “[w]here a defendant merely houses and maintains a system where ‘copies’ can be made[,] some other conduct must be shown to demonstrate that the defendant operates the copying device.” It likened itself to a copy shop proprietor who has merely made his copy machines available to his customers. In such a situation, ReDigi claimed (while borrowing the analogy from Cablevision), the proprietor could not be held liable as a direct infringer since it would be the customers who made the copies.

ReDigi contended that there was no volitional conduct on its part where it provided a service that merely followed the commands of its users. Allowing its users to upload files, continued ReDigi, “is not conduct that is operational in a way that is more than Cablevision’s conduct, which the Second Circuit found did not confer direct liability on Cablevision.” ReDigi argued that its involvement in the selection and screening of each music file was no different than Cablevision’s selection and screening of the programming that it provided to its customers. Just because it had some say in which files were available on its system, ReDigi disputed that this made it the party who made the copies under the clear import of Cablevision.

In Capitol’s reply memorandum of law in support of its motion for partial summary judgment, it reiterated the argument that ReDigi had engaged in the requisite volitional conduct. Capitol claimed that ReDigi, unlike Cablevision, “does much more than ‘house’ a system used for copying.” It pressed that ReDigi scanned users’ computers for eligible digital music files, assisted users in uploading the files to offer them for sale, encouraged users to buy and sell the files, and searched for files to match other users’ specific requests. These facts, Capitol pointed out, were not contested by ReDigi. Thus, Capitol continued, ReDigi “does much more than passively ‘allow[] a user to command the system to upload files’” since it “urges and walks users through every stage of its infringing system.” Capitol concluded that this made ReDigi a direct infringer.

ReDigi’s Volitional Conduct

The briefing and motion hearing having been completed, the district court was faced with deciding whether ReDigi had engaged in the volitional conduct necessary to find it liable as a direct infringer in light of the Second Circuit’s opinion in Cablevision—binding precedent on the court since it sits in the Second Circuit. The court’s analysis on the direct liability issue was as follows:

To be liable for direct infringement, a defendant must have engaged in some volitional conduct sufficient to show that it actively violated one of the plaintiff’s exclusive rights. In other words, to establish direct liability under the Act, something more must be shown than mere ownership of a machine used by others to make illegal copies. There must be actual infringing conduct with a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying that one could conclude that the machine owner himself trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.

In Cartoon Network, the Second Circuit addressed whether the cable television provider Cablevision had directly infringed the plaintiff’s copyrights by providing digital video recording devices to its customers. The court determined that it had not. Though Cablevision had designed, housed, and maintained the recording devices, it was Cablevision’s customers who made the copies and therefore directly infringed the plaintiff’s reproduction rights. The court reasoned that, in determining who actually makes a copy, a significant difference exists between making a request to a human employee, who then volitionally operates the copying system to make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, which automatically obeys commands and engages in no volitional conduct. However, the court allowed that a case may exist where one’s contribution to the creation of an infringing copy is so great that it warrants holding that party directly liable for the infringement, even though another party has actually made the copy.

On the record before it, the Court concludes that, if such a case could ever occur, it has occurred with ReDigi. ReDigi’s founders built a service where only copyrighted work could be sold. Unlike Cablevision’s programming, which offered a mix of protected and public television, ReDigi’s Media Manager scans a user’s computer to build a list of eligible files that consists solely of protected music purchased on iTunes. While that process is itself automated, absolving ReDigi of direct liability on that ground alone would be a distinction without a difference. The fact that ReDigi’s founders programmed their software to choose copyrighted content satisfies the volitional conduct requirement and renders ReDigi’s case indistinguishable from those where human review of content gave rise to direct liability. Moreover, unlike Cablevision, ReDigi infringed both Capitol’s reproduction and distribution rights. ReDigi provided the infrastructure for its users’ infringing sales and affirmatively brokered sales by connecting users who are seeking unavailable songs with potential sellers. Given this fundamental and deliberate role, the Court concludes that ReDigi’s conduct transformed it from a passive provider of a space in which infringing activities happened to occur to an active participant in the process of copyright infringement. Accordingly, the Court grants Capitol’s motion for summary judgment on its claims for ReDigi’s direct infringement of its distribution and reproduction rights.16

This reasoning fascinates me. It’s not so much that I think Judge Sullivan did a good job of distinguishing Cablevision—he didn’t—but rather it’s because I think the Second Circuit in Cablevision misapplied its own test. The key is to go back to Netcom. The district court there held that Netcom could not be directly liable for infringement that occurred using its system since, as an internet access provider, it was truly a passive conduit that played no role in selecting or controlling the illicit content available to its subscribers over its system. Netcom in fact was just like a copy shop proprietor who merely made his copy machines available to the public. That some people may have infringed using the proprietor’s copy machines would not, without more, mean that the proprietor directly caused the copies to be made. His liability, if any, would be indirect.

The Second Circuit analogized Cablevision to such a copy shop proprietor, but the analogy missed the mark. A copy shop proprietor who merely provided his copy machines to the public played no part in selecting what got copied and had no control over how the machines were used. But where the copy shop proprietor played a more significant role in the copying, such as by operating the machines himself, he would be liable as a direct infringer for the copying that took place—even if the customers selected which materials were to be copied and even if the proprietor was merely fulfilling his customers’ requests.17 Cablevision didn’t just supply the copy machines, but rather it selected and supplied the very materials to be copied while maintaining complete control over its copy machines throughout the entire process.

The test for direct liability, formulated by the Fourth Circuit in CoStar and adopted by the Second Circuit in Cablevision, is whether there is “actual infringing conduct with a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying that one could conclude that the machine owner himself trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.”18 The nexus between Cablevision and the illicit copying was far more proximate than that of Netcom or of a copy shop proprietor who has made his copy machines available to the public. The only thing Cablevision’s customers did was make the requests; Cablevision did all the rest. The Second Circuit reasoned that there was insufficient volitional conduct on Cablevision’s part because it was its customers who pressed the button to initiate the copying. This underplays the significant volitional conduct that Cablevision engaged in by designing, housing, and maintaining its system that existed for no other purpose than to copy the very materials that it had selected and provided.

Judge Sullivan got it right when he noted that relieving ReDigi of direct liability because the processes involved were automated “would be a distinction without a difference.”19 Setting up a machine to do the very same task as a human does not completely erase the volitional conduct that goes into programming the machine. Judge Sullivan attempted to distinguish Cablevision by noting that (1) Cablevision offered protected and public works while ReDigi offered only protected works, and (2) ReDigi involved both the reproduction and distribution rights while Cablevision did not. Neither of these reasons is persuasive. First, it’s not at all clear that Cablevision offered any works that weren’t protected by copyright. Try as I might, I can’t find that distinction in the opinion. Nor do I see how it could possibly matter—whatever unprotected works may have been available on Cablevision’s system were irrelevant to the issue of the protected ones. Second, I don’t see how the fact that Cablevision didn’t involve the distribution right takes away from its discussion of the reproduction right. Cablevision addressed the public performance right as well, but that doesn’t mean that its discussion of the reproduction right is irrelevant.

Regardless, I think Judge Sullivan’s analysis of the volitional conduct element reflected, as the Second Circuit noted in Cablevision, that “the purpose of any causation-based liability doctrine is to identify the actor (or actors) whose conduct has been so significant and important a cause that he or she should be legally responsible.”20 Judge Sullivan recognized the absurdity of pretending that a service provider, who does 99% of the work in creating an illicit copy, does not in fact cause the copy to be made because a user does the other 1% by simply pressing a button. I think his application of Cablevision was perhaps faithless, but I think that Cablevision itself was faithless in its own application of the rule set forth in Netcom and CoStar. Judge Sullivan however, unlike the Second Circuit, was faithful in his commitment to causation-based tort principles.

Follow me on Twitter: @devlinhartline

  1. See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) (“Intention to infringe is not essential under the act.”); 3 Patry on Copyright § 9:5 (same). []
  2. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Services, Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995). []
  3. Id. at 1368. []
  4. Id. []
  5. Id. at 1368-69. []
  6. Id. at 1370-71. []
  7. Id. at 1372. []
  8. CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). []
  9. Id. (emphasis in original). []
  10. Id. at 550. []
  11. Id. at 551. []
  12. Id. at 555. []
  13. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). []
  14. Id. at 131. []
  15. Id. []
  16. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., No. 12-cv-00095, 2013 WL 1286134, *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2013) (internal quotations, brackets, ellipses, and citations omitted). []
  17. See, e.g., RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F.Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that copy shop proprietor who made copies at customer’s request of materials selected by customer was directly liable for infringement); Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (same). []
  18. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130. []
  19. Capitol Records, 2013 WL 1286134 at *12. []
  20. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 132 (internal quotations and brackets omitted). []
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A Closer Look at the Righthaven Standing Issue

Cross-posted on the Copyhype blog.

Love them or loathe them, notorious copyright enforcer Righthaven presents an interesting question of law: Does Righthaven, the assignee of a copyright plus the accrued causes of action, have standing to sue for past infringements if it grants back to its assignor, Stephens Media, an exclusive license to exploit the copyright? The district courts that have considered this question have all found that such an arrangement does not leave Righthaven with an ownership interest sufficient to have standing. I think they’re wrong.

Last month, Righthaven finally had its day before the Ninth Circuit when it participated in oral arguments in two of its appeals (audio available here).1 These appeals almost didn’t happen. Back in late 2011, a district court granted a motion to appoint a receiver made by one of Righthaven’s defendants, Wayne Hoehn. The court ordered Righthaven’s intellectual and tangible property to be assigned to the receiver so that it could be sold to partially satisfy Hoehn’s judgment against Righthaven. Despite the fact that the receivership was explicitly for this limited purpose,2 the receiver had more grandiose plans. When she found out that Righthaven CEO Steven Gibson was planning to appeal Hoehn’s victory, the receiver reported to the district court that she had taken over the company, fired Gibson, and fired the counsel Gibson had lined up to prosecute the appeal.

The receiver argued that, given Righthaven’s poor chances of success on appeal, it was in the best interests of the receivership to cease the appeals process. She also claimed, somewhat circularly, that since Righthaven no longer owned any of the copyrights that it had sued over, it had no standing to pursue its appeals before the Ninth Circuit.3 The very issue on appeal, of course, was whether Righthaven owned the copyrights and had standing to sue, and it is elementary that a party has standing to appeal a district court’s determination that it does not have standing to sue.4 Exercising her mandate that she thought gave her “broad, almost limitless equitable powers,” the receiver sought to have the court ratify her decision to torpedo the appeals. The district court rebuffed the receiver’s request, clarifying that the receivership was for the limited purpose of selling Righthaven’s assets—not for the purpose of firing Righthaven’s counsel and withdrawing its appeals.5

Having won that small victory in the district court, Righthaven’s fate is now being decided by a panel of the Ninth Circuit. The legal question presented on the standing issue is actually a rather straightforward and simple application of the law. Yet, I believe that every court that has so far addressed the issue has approached it in the wrong way. I think the blame lies mainly with Righthaven’s poor briefing of the somewhat metaphysical doctrine of copyright ownership, but I think the judiciary’s unfamiliarity with the issues has played a role as well. In this article, I’ll explain why I think the Righthaven standing issue is simple and why I think Righthaven has standing to sue for past infringements.

Silvers v. Sony

In the Ninth Circuit, where the Righthaven appeals are being prosecuted, the Silvers v. Sony case controls the standing analysis. In the district court, the plaintiff, Nancey Silvers, claimed that the defendant, Sony Pictures, had infringed the copyright in a television movie she had written on a work-for-hire basis with the production company Frank & Bob Films.6 Since Silvers had no ownership interest in the copyright by way of her work-for-hire contract,7 Frank & Bob Films assigned to her the accrued causes of action so that she could pursue the alleged infringement on her own. Sony argued that Silvers was not a “legal or beneficial owner” under the Act and thus had no standing to sue.8

Silvers, on the other hand, cited the copyright treatise Nimmer on Copyright which at the time provided that “the assignee of an accrued infringement cause of action has standing to sue without the need to join his assignor, even if the latter retains ownership of all other rights under the copyright.”9 The district court, citing Nimmer, the text of the Act, and public policy, sided with Silvers, holding that she had standing to sue even though owning only the accrued causes of action: “Where the cause of action has already accrued, though, the claim is akin to a vested right, and the Court sees no reason why a copyright holder, like any other property owner, would not have the ability to assign that right.”10

A few months later, the district court granted Sony’s motion for interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit on the standing issue.11 There, the appellate panel noted that it was a matter of first impression in the circuit “whether an accrued cause of action for copyright infringement may be assigned to a third party, without any other copyright rights accompanying the assignment.”12 The panel echoed the reasoning of the district court below, citing Nimmer, the text of the Act, and public policy, to conclude that:

Nothing in the statute prohibits the legal or beneficial owner of the exclusive right under copyright from assigning an accrued cause of action for infringement of that right. Such an assignment is like assignment of any other chose in action under contract theory. Nothing in the language of the statute prohibits or restricts an assignee of an accrued infringement cause of action from bringing a copyright infringement action.13

Unhappy with its defeat before the district court and the appellate panel, Sony petitioned for and was granted a rehearing en banc.14 There, the en banc majority reversed the district court, holding instead that an assignee of accrued causes of action who has no other legal of beneficial ownership in the copyright has no standing to sue for past infringements.15

The majority started its analysis by noting that standing to sue in copyright, a creature of federal statute, is authorized by Section 501(b) of the Copyright Act which provides:

The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.16

The majority reasoned that, under the plain language of the statute, one must be a “legal or beneficial owner” of the exclusive right at issue in order to have standing to sue. The court deduced that since an accrued cause of action is not one of the listed rights in Section 106, its holder is not a “legal or beneficial owner” of the copyright unless she also has some other ownership interest in it. The majority went on to examine the legislative history of the Act, patent law, and opinions from other circuits to conclude that “[t]he bare assignment of an accrued cause of action is impermissible under 17 U.S.C. § 501(b). Because that is all Frank & Bob Films conveyed to Silvers, Silvers was not entitled to institute and may not maintain this action against Sony” for the alleged infringement.17

It should be noted that the majority did not see a problem with assigning an accrued cause of action, finding the practice to be consistent with the Copyright Act and its constitutional purpose. Moreover, the majority provided the rationale for allowing such transfers: “When one acquires a copyright that has been infringed, one is acquiring a copyright whose value has been impaired. Consequently, to receive maximum value for the impaired copyright, one must also convey the right to recover the value of the impairment by instituting a copyright action.”18 Thus, it was not the assignment of the accrued causes of action that posed a problem for the majority. The problem was, in the majority’s opinion, that such an assignee was not also a “legal or beneficial owner” entitled to institute an action under Section 501(b) of the Act.

Personally, I think the majority’s analysis is rather poor—while purporting to prevent a circuit split,19 the majority in fact only caused one.20 I’ll sketch out some of the basic problems with the decision here, but the topic is complicated and rightfully deserving of its own post. The majority was correct to note that an accrued cause of action is assignable. Such was the case under the 1909 Act as it is now under the 1976 Act. This comports with the common law view generally that an accrued cause of action for a property tort is itself a property interest that is freely assignable.21 The twist added to this general rule by the majority is that it read Section 501(b) as mandating that the accrued causes of action must be accompanied by an ownership interest in the copyright, else the holder is not a “legal or beneficial owner” with statutory standing to sue under the Copyright Act.

The majority misreads Section 501(b). On its face, the statute appears to say that an accrued cause of action is not assignable since it authorizes the “legal or beneficial owner . . . to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.” But, as the majority itself demonstrates, courts do not interpret it this way. Instead, the statute is read to mean that a cause of action accrues to whomever is the “legal or beneficial owner” at the time the cause of action accrues. Once the cause of action accrues to the “legal or beneficial owner,” it becomes a vested property interest that can be assigned to another, as the majority rightly concedes. What the majority misses is that such an assignee has standing to sue because he is a “legal or beneficial owner” of the underlying exclusive right, even if he is conveyed no other ownership interest in it.

There’s two different ways to look at this. The first is to realize that an assignee stands in the shoes of his assignor.22 The courts allow the assignee to take on his assignor’s position, so that if the assignor was the “legal or beneficial owner” at the time the cause of action accrued, the assignee steps into his shoes and can claim to have been such an owner as well. The second way to look at this is to recognize that an owner of an accrued cause of action is himself a “legal or beneficial owner” in his own right since an accrued cause of action is an in rem property interest in the underlying exclusive right. Not only can he claim his assignor’s ownership status as it relates back to when the cause of action accrued, he can claim his own ownership status for the purposes of standing.

This is demonstrated in the case law. The general rule is that, unless a copyright assignment expressly includes the accrued causes of action, an assignee of a copyright—even one who obtains otherwise full legal and equitable ownership—is not also transferred the accrued causes of action and does not have standing to sue for past infringements.23 Instead, the assignor, who no longer holds any other ownership interest in the copyright, is alone permitted to sue for past infringements.24 Under the majority’s logic, this should not be possible since it reasons that a party who holds only the accrued causes of action and no other ownership interest is not a “legal or beneficial owner” under Section 501(b). The majority conspicuously fails to address this point.

Nor does the majority address another wrinkle in the doctrine which provides that a copyright owner who otherwise parts with legal and equitable ownership of an exclusive right, while retaining the right to receive royalties from its future exploitation, has standing to sue for later occurring infringements of that right.25 Under the majority’s reasoning, since the right to receive royalties is not an enumerated right under Section 106, such a rightholder would not have standing to sue. But Congress clearly intended otherwise by explicitly providing in the legislative history of the Act that such a party would be a “beneficial owner” of the underlying exclusive right with standing to sue for its infringement.26 The simple explanation for this is that, like the holder of the accrued causes of action, the holder of the right to receive royalties has an in rem interest in the exclusive right that makes him the “legal or beneficial owner” of it.

While the majority was perhaps correct to note that Section 501(b) limits standing to sue to only a “legal or beneficial owner” of the underlying exclusive right, it somehow missed the jurisprudential gloss that such ownership may relate back in time to that of his assignor’s ownership, such as with an assignee of an accrued cause of action, or may include one who otherwise has no present legal or beneficial ownership interest, such as with an assignor of all legal and beneficial ownership who retains the accrued causes of action or retains the right to receive royalties. Thus, the question is not, as the majority perceived it, whether he currently controls the exploitation of the exclusive right. The question is whether he holds an in rem ownership interest in the exclusive right, whether via the “shoes” of his assignor or in his own right.

The majority’s reasoning makes other critical mistakes, such as misinterpreting the legislative history and misreading the case law from other circuits. But for better or for worse, Silvers is the law in the Ninth Circuit and a holder of an accrued cause of action has no standing to sue unless he also holds some other legal or beneficial ownership in the underlying exclusive right.

The Righthaven Assignment

It was against this legal backdrop that Righthaven and Stephens Media executed the contract that’s at issue here. The contract actually consists of two parts, a “Copyright Assignment” and a supplemental agreement militaristically dubbed the “Strategic Alliance Agreement” (“SAA”). The Copyright Assignment in relevant part provides:

Stephens Media hereby transfers, vests and assigns the work depicted in Exhibit A, attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference (the “Work”), to Righthaven, subject to Stephens Media’s rights of reversion, all copyrights requisite to have Righthaven recognized as the copyright owner of the Work for purposes of Righthaven being able to claim ownership as well as the right to pursue past, present and future infringements of the copyright in and to the Work.

By itself, the Copyright Assignment conveys ownership of the underlying exclusive rights and the accrued causes of action to Righthaven, which under the majority opinion in Silvers would grant Righthaven standing to sue for past infringements. In fact, district courts that looked at only the Copyright Assignment had no trouble finding that it granted Righthaven standing to sue.27 Thus, it is with the addition of the SAA to the Copyright Assignment that the Righthaven standing issue arises.

The provision of the SAA which has received the most attention is Section 7.2, which in relevant part provides:

Despite any such Copyright Assignment, Stephens Media shall retain (and is hereby granted by Righthaven) an exclusive license to Exploit the Stephens Media Assigned Copyrights for any lawful purpose whatsoever and Righthaven shall have no right or license to Exploit or participate in the receipt of royalties from the Exploitation of the Stephens Media Assigned Copyrights other than the right to proceeds in association with a Recovery.

Other sections of the SAA have received notice too, such as Section 5 which provides that Righthaven is to split recoveries minus costs with Stephens Media and Section 8 which provides Stephens Media with a reversionary right in the copyrights assigned to Righthaven, but Section 7.2 is the one that’s caused the most fuss.

The first serious blow to Righthaven came in the Democratic Underground case, wherein Chief Judge Roger Hunt noted that the SAA was “highly relevant to Righthaven’s standing in this and a multitude of other pending Righthaven cases.”28 In his opinion, the SAA “expressly denies Righthaven any rights . . . other than the bare right to bring and profit from copyright infringement actions.”29 He reasoned that under Section 7.2 of the SAA, Righthaven received no other ownership interest in the underlying exclusive rights: “The plain and simple effect of this section was to prevent Righthaven from obtaining, having, or otherwise exercising any right other than the mere right to sue as Stephens Media retained all other rights.”30

As to Righthaven’s argument that the SAA did not alter its standing under the clear import of the Copyright Agreement, Chief Judge Hunt quipped: “This conclusion is flagrantly false—to the point that the claim is disingenuous, if not outright deceitful. The entirety of the SAA was designed to prevent Righthaven from becoming an owner of any exclusive right in the copyright . . . .”31 He then held that under the majority opinion in Silvers, Righthaven, as the holder of only the accrued causes of action, did not have standing to sue: “In reality, Righthaven actually left the transaction with nothing more than a fabrication since a copyright owner cannot assign a bare right to sue after Silvers.”32

Six days after Chief Judge Hunt issued his seminal opinion in Democratic Underground, the district court in the Hoehn case followed suit, finding that the “carveouts” in the SAA “deprive Righthaven of any of the rights normally associated with ownership of an exclusive right necessary to bring suit for copyright infringement and leave Righthaven no rights except to pursue infringement actions . . . .”33 The day after that, Chief Judge Hunt issued an opinion in the DiBiase case, finding again that the SAA left Righthaven without “the exclusive rights necessary to maintain standing in a copyright infringement action,” and incorporating his opinion in Democratic Underground by reference.34 It is these opinions in the Hoehn and DiBiase cases that form the basis of Righthaven’s appeals before the Ninth Circuit.

Why Righthaven Has Standing

Much like the majority in Silvers failed to recognize that the holder of only the accrued causes of action is a “legal or beneficial owner” of the underlying exclusive right, so too have the district courts that have analyzed the Righthaven standing issue failed to recognize that Righthaven has an ownership interest in the underlying exclusive rights in addition to the accrued causes of action. As discussed above, the Copyright Assignment grants to Righthaven ownership of the underlying exclusive rights plus ownership of the accrued causes of action. The SAA supplements the Copyright Assignment, and it provides that “Stephens Media shall retain (and is hereby granted by Righthaven) an exclusive license” to exploit the exclusive rights and to keep the royalties to itself. The mistake made by the district courts is interpreting this simultaneous retention by (or license back to) Stephens Media as divesting Righthaven of whatever ownership interests in the underlying exclusive rights that the Copyright Assignment may have granted it.

The Copyright Assignment and SAA instead should be read as dismembering the ownership such that Righthaven became the legal owner and Stephens Media remained the beneficial owner of the underlying exclusive rights. The key to understanding the Righthaven standing issue is to recognize that legal ownership of an exclusive right can be held by one in trust for another who is a beneficial owner. In such a trust relationship, the legal owner holds legal title while the beneficial owner holds equitable title to the underlying exclusive rights.35 The Copyright Assignment and SAA simply transferred to Righthaven legal title to the underlying exclusive rights and the accrued causes of action, while Stephens Media retained or was simultaneously granted back—it matters not which way you look at it since both achieve the same result—the equitable title to the underlying exclusive rights.

The following table illustrates the legal and beneficial ownership interests held by Righthaven and Stephens Media before and after the Copyright Assignment and SAA:

righthaven_ownership

 

The whole point of the Copyright Assignment and SAA was to comply with the dictate in Silvers. Righthaven was not assigned only the accrued causes of action, but it was assigned legal title to the underlying exclusive rights as well. Thus, as the legal owner of the underlying exclusive rights and the accrued causes of action, Righthaven has standing to sue for past infringements under the rule declared by the Silvers majority. The very purpose of the Copyright Assignment and SAA was to give both legal title and the accrued causes of action to Righthaven while Stephens Media kept the equitable title for itself. The parties did exactly what Silvers said to do.

Contrary to Chief Judge Hunt’s quip that Righthaven’s representation about the SAA was “flagrantly false—to the point that the claim is disingenuous, if not outright deceitful,” I think Righthaven’s claim that the SAA did not affect its standing was correct. The reason is simple: The SAA did not divest Righthaven of the legal title or the accrued causes of action that it had been granted in the Copyright Assignment. To be sure, the SAA established in the underlying exclusive rights both in personam contractual rights and in rem property interests, but none of those equitable interests changed the fact that Righthaven still held its legal interests and the accrued causes of action.36

The district courts that have looked at the Righthaven standing issue have misconstrued the difference between an assignment, which typically transfers both legal and equitable title, and an exclusive license, which transfers only equitable title.37 The difference is critical. Courts are familiar with the concept of an exclusive licensee, and an entire body of federal common law has developed around this type of ownership interest. But antiquated concepts, such as the idea that an exclusive licensee holds equitable title, tend to get lost—though some remnants appear in the 1976 Act. For example, Section 301(a) preempts “all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 . . . .”38 This presupposes the existence of both legal and equitable rights in a copyright.

Another example is Section 501(b)’s provision that a “legal or beneficial owner” has standing to sue. Courts often indicate that both legal owners and exclusive licensees have standing under this section, but they don’t make the connection that the legal titleholder is the “legal owner” while the exclusive licensee, who holds equitable title, is the “beneficial owner.” Back before the merger of law and equity, whether one’s title was legal or equitable mattered significantly since only the legal owner could institute an action in a court of law. Equitable owners, such as an exclusive licensee, had to bring suit in a court of equity.39 The merger of law and equity did away with the procedural, but not the substantive, differences between the two.40 It was not until the 1976 Act that legal and equitable ownership interests were put on an equal footing for certain purposes, but—and this is crucial—they still remain distinct types of ownership interests.

The 1976 Act itself creates confusion over exactly what an exclusive license is. Section 101 provides:

A “transfer of copyright ownership” is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.41

Thus, an assignment and an exclusive license are both a “transfer of copyright ownership.” What kind of ownership is transferred, the statute doesn’t say. The answer, developed in the case law that Section 101 merely ratified, is rather simple. Generally speaking, an assignment transfers legal and equitable title while an exclusive license transfers only equitable title. Both are a “transfer of copyright ownership,” as noted by Section 101, but the ownership interests transferred are different. Section 501(b) tells us this difference matters not in at least one significant way since both the “legal or beneficial owner” has standing to sue. The combined purpose of Sections 101 and 501(b) in the 1976 Act was to put an equitable titleholder, such as an exclusive licensee, on an equal footing with his licensor, the holder of legal title, for purposes of standing to sue. Much like the merger of law and equity had eliminated some of the procedural differences between legal and equitable ownership, the 1976 Act eradicated some of the substantive differences between the two as well.

That a licensor has a different type of ownership interest than his exclusive licensee was made clear in Gardner v. Nike,42 an opinion out of the Ninth Circuit from 2002. There, Nike had granted an exclusive license to Sony Music, and the issue was whether Sony Music could then transfer its exclusive license to Gardner. The district court held that an exclusive licensee could not transfer his ownership interest to another without his licensor’s permission, and the Ninth Circuit agreed. The appellate panel relied on Section 201(d)(2) of the Act which provides that the owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled “to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner” under the Act.43 Thus, reasoned the court, an exclusive licensee is vested with only the same “protections and remedies,” but not the same rights, as his licensor. If an exclusive licensee actually had legal ownership of the underlying exclusive right, his ability to transfer his interest to another would not be so saddled. Gardner v. Nike proves that exclusive licensees are not legal owners—at least in the Ninth Circuit where Righthaven is prosecuting its appeals.

There’s another layer that’s worth a mention. While Section 301(a) sounds in the general common law of property by referring to “legal or equitable rights,” Section 501(b) sounds in the general common law of trusts by referring to a “legal or beneficial owner.” The analogy to trust law is deliberate, for it was noted long ago that the licensor-exclusive licensee relationship is just like that of a trustee-beneficiary, with one holding legal title in trust for the other who is an equitable or beneficial owner of the property.44 Trust law and copyright law have obviously gone their separate ways, but the analogy between the two remains and is at times instructive. It’s just not often that it’s mentioned anymore, much less so that it matters like it does here with Righthaven.

The analogy to trust law has not been totally lost, nor is it necessarily only an analogy, as demonstrated in the fifteen-year-old opinion in A. Brod, Inc. v. SK&I Co.45 penned by then-District Judge Sonia Sotomayor. The facts there, somewhat similar to Righthaven’s, were that one party had assigned to the other “the entire right, title, and interest” to a particular copyright for the purpose of litigation.46 The assignor, who wanted his copyright back, argued that the assignment really included only the legal title which his assignee held in trust for him as the equitable titleholder. The assignee denied the legal possibility of a trust, claiming that “trust-based rights in the copyright are preempted by the Copyright Act.”47 Judge Sotomayor did not agree:

[L]egal and equitable interest in a copyright may be held separately. As cases pre-dating the 1976 Copyright Act make clear, a copyright may constitute a proper trust res, with the trustee holding legal title to the copyright and the settlor retaining equitable title. The 1976 Copyright Act did not change this, but rather codified the notion that both the equitable, or “beneficial,” owner of a copyright and the legal owner have standing to sue for infringement.48

Judge Sotomayor went on to analyze the assignment under New York state trust law, looking at whether it created an express or constructive trust such that the trustee-assignee’s subsequent transfer of his interest to a third party was subject to the assignor’s equitable interest in the trust. I think the soundness of this approach is dubious, as federal common and statutory law trumps state law when it comes to copyright ownership. The problem with analyzing copyright ownership under state trust law is that then concepts such as a good faith purchaser for value get injected into what is otherwise a federal common law scheme. The en banc Federal Circuit has rejected such an approach with patents,49 and I think the same logic applies with equal force to copyrights. Copyright ownership issues should be decided applying federal copyright law which, while analogous to state trust law in some ways, is not the same thing.

So where does that leave us? Based on the oral arguments before the Ninth Circuit panel, things do not look good for Righthaven. One judge queried which party, Righthaven or Stephens Media, a prospective user of the copyright should approach for permission. Since it isn’t Righthaven, the judge implied, it means that Righthaven doesn’t really own the copyright and therefore does not have standing to sue. But this line of questioning misses the fact that there’s two types of ownership interests in a copyright, legal and equitable. A prospective user would contact the party who holds the equitable title to the exclusive right that he wishes permission to use since only that party controls the use of that right. But it should not be forgotten that legal ownership may reside in another—and that appears to be the case here with Righthaven.

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  1. The Ninth Circuit joined two of Righthaven’s appeals for purposes of oral arguments: Righthaven v. Hoehn and Righthaven v. DiBiase. []
  2. The motion that was granted provides the following summary: “Defendant Wayne Hoehn (‘Hoehn’), through his attorneys, brings this motion seeking this Court to order the appointment of a receiver to which Plaintiff Righthaven LLC (‘Righthaven’) shall assign all of its intellectual property and other intangible property, which the receiver shall auction in order to partially satisfy Hoehn’s judgment and writ of execution entered against Righthaven. (Docs. # 44, 59)”; Hoehn also sought that “all objects, items, or other property belonging to Righthaven should be delivered to the Receiver for auction,” though it was “presumed that Righthaven owns little tangible property of material value.” []
  3. The receiver argued: “Moreover, as Righthaven no longer owns any of the copyright rights it originally sued Hoehn and others for infringing, it no longer possesses standing to pursue its claims before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals or any other Court. (Doc. # 90) This further affirms my view that the receivership estate’s best interests at this point are served by making the estate as productive as possible for its many creditors, and by terminating the existing appeals.” []
  4. See, e.g., In re Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co. Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 543 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1976) (“A party denied standing to sue, or to intervene, or to object, may obviously appeal such a determination. The question of standing does not go to whether or not the appeal should be heard, but rather to its merits.”). []
  5. Docket entry 117 provides in part: “The Court clarifies the scope of the Receivership and confirms the Receivership was for the limited purpose to dispose of assets to satisfy the judgment, not to fire counsel handling the appeal and not to take any other action regarding Righthaven’s appeal.” []
  6. See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, No. 00-cv-6386, 2001 WL 36127624 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2001). []
  7. See 17 U.S.C.A. 201(b) (West 2013) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”). []
  8. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(b) (West 2013) (“The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.”). []
  9. Silvers, 2001 WL 36127624 at *1 (quoting Nimmer on Copyright § 12.02[B]) (internal quotations omitted). []
  10. Id. at *2. []
  11. See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Interlocutory Appeal, No. 00-cv-6386, 2001 WL 36127626 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2001). []
  12. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 330 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 2003). []
  13. Id. at 1208. []
  14. See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 370 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2004). []
  15. See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005). []
  16. 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(b) (West 2013). []
  17. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 890. []
  18. Id. at 890 n.1 []
  19. See id. (“[T]he creation of a circuit split would be particularly troublesome in the realm of copyright.”). []
  20. See Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1969); Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., Inc., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1991). []
  21. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Hafer, 49 Ohio St. 60, 66 (1892) (“Mere personal torts die with the party, and are not assignable; but where the action is brought for damage to the estate, and not for injury to the person, personal feelings, or character, and the right of action survives to the personal representative, it may be assigned so as to pass an interest to the assignee.”); Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. 193, 213 (1828) (“In general, it may be affirmed, that mere personal torts, which die with the party, and do not survive to his personal representative, are not capable of passing by assignment; and that vested rights ad rem and in re, possibilities coupled with an interest, and claims growing out of, and adhering to property, may pass by assignment.”); 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 43 (“A chose in action or claim, whether arising in tort or contract, is generally assignable, as a chose in action is personal property.”). []
  22. See, e.g., 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments § 134 (“Although an assignee acquires the rights of the assignor, including the right to enforce the assigned obligation, he or she does not sue in his or her own right, but stands in the shoes of the assignor.”); RTC Commercial Loan Trust 1995-NP1A v. Winthrop Mgmt., 923 F.Supp. 83, 88 (E.D. Va. 1996) (“[I]t is a fundamental maxim of common law that the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor . . . .”). []
  23. See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Thus, a copyright owner can assign its copyright but, if the accrued causes of action are not expressly included in the assignment, the assignee will not be able to prosecute them.”); Giddings v. Vision House Prod., Inc., 584 F.Supp.2d 1222, 1229 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“Copyright assignments do not include accrued causes of action unless they are expressly included in the assignment.”); 3-12 Nimmer on Copyright § 12.02 (“[O]nly the grantor, not the grantee, has standing to sue for pre-grant infringement, even if the action is filed after the grant has been executed.”). []
  24. See, e.g., Skor-Mor Products, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1982 WL 1264 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1982) (“Similarly, it is the assignor, not the assignee, who has standing to sue for infringing acts which occurred prior to the assignment of copyright.”); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Rather, the assignee is only entitled to bring actions for infringements that were committed while it was the copyright owner and the assignor retains the right to bring actions accruing during its ownership of the right, even if the actions are brought subsequent to the assignment.”); M.J. Golden & Co. v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 137 F.Supp. 455, 457 (D. Pa. 1956) (“[E]ven though there has been a sale of the copyright this does not prevent the owner at the time of the alleged infringement from suing for previous damages it alleges to have sustained while it was the owner.”). []
  25. See, e.g., Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 1984) (“When a composer assigns copyright title to a publisher in exchange for the payment of royalties, an equitable trust relationship is established between the two parties which gives the composer standing to sue for infringement of that copyright. Otherwise the beneficial owner’s interest in the copyright could be diluted or lessened by a wrongdoer’s infringement.”) (internal citations omitted). []
  26. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 159 (“A ‘beneficial owner’ for this purpose would include, for example, an author who had parted with legal title to the copyright in exchange for percentage royalties based on sales or license fees.”). []
  27. See, e.g., Righthaven LLC v. Dr. Shezad Malik Law Firm P.C., No. 10-cv-0636, 2010 WL 3522372, *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 2, 2010) (Hunt, C.J.) (“Furthermore, the assignment in question (which Plaintiff has attached to its opposition) clearly assigns both the exclusive copyright ownership, together with accrued causes of action, i.e., infringements past, present and future. While Courts have denied standing to bring an action on an accrued claim where just the copyright is owned or just the cause of action has been assigned, where there is an assignment of both the copyright, and any accrued causes of action, the courts have held that the assignee of both can bring an action even for infringing activities which occurred before the assignment. Thus, in this instance, Plaintiff has standing to sue, even for an infringement which preceded the assignment, because that right was specifically assigned with the exclusive assignment of the copyright itself.”) (internal citations omitted). []
  28. Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F.Supp.2d 968, 971 (D. Nev. 2011) (Hunt, C.J.). []
  29. Id. at 972. []
  30. Id. (italics in original). []
  31. Id. at 973 (italics in original; internal quotations omitted). []
  32. Id. []
  33. Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F.Supp.2d 1138, 1146 (D. Nev. 2011) (Pro, J.). []
  34. Righthaven, LLC v. DiBiase, No. 10-cv-01343, 2011 WL 2473531, *1 (D. Nev. June 22, 2011) (Hunt, C.J.). []
  35. See, e.g., Black v. Henry G. Allen Co., 42 F. 618, 621 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890) ([T]here is no restriction upon the power of the proprietor to assign or transfer, in equity, an exclusive right to use the copyrighted book in a particular manner or for particular purposes upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon. In such case the legal title remains in the proprietor; and a beneficial interest, to the extent which is agreed upon, vests in the other party, who has acquired an equitable right in the copyright, and who will be properly styled an assignee of an equitable interest.”) (internal quotations omitted); Bisel v. Ladner, 1 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1924) (“The legal title to a copyright vests in the person in whose name the copyright is taken out. It may, however, be held by him in trust for the true owner . . . .”); Manning v. Miller Music Corp., 174 F.Supp. 192, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (“[T]he courts recognize that legal title to a copyright may be in one person and equitable title in another. Thus, one may be a ‘proprietor’ of a copyright if he holds legal title, though equitable title may be in another wither expressly or as trustee ex malificio.”) (internal citations omitted); Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 F. 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1921) (“There is nothing in the nature of copyright forbidding a separation between the legal and equitable titles; one may hold in trust for others . . . .”); Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1578 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing patents) (“Equitable title may be defined as the beneficial interest of one person whom equity regards as the real owner, although the legal title is vested in another.”) (internal quotations omitted); Matter of Southmark Corp., 49 F.3d 1111, 1117-18 (5th Cir. 1995) (“In a trust relationship, by contrast, the law actually divides the bundle of rights in the property; the trustee holds legal title while the beneficiary possesses an equitable title or property interest.”). []
  36. See, e.g., Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club of Dist. of Columbia, 227 U.S. 633, 636 (1913) (“A contract binds the person of the maker, but does not create an interest in the property that it may concern, unless it also operates as a conveyance.”); Matter of Southmark Corp., 49 F.3d 1111, 1117-18 (5th Cir. 1995) (“At the outset, it is important to distinguish generally between two types of ‘equitable interests.’ In a contractual (or debtor-creditor) relationship, the creditor may possess an ‘equitable claim’ to property actually owned by the debtor, but there is no division of ownership or title in the property at issue; the debtor is entirely free to dispose of the property as he sees fit. In a trust relationship, by contrast, the law actually divides the bundle of rights in the property; the trustee holds legal title while the beneficiary possesses an equitable title or property interest.”). []
  37. See, e.g., Presley’s Estate v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339, 1350 (D.N.J. 1981) (“An assignment passes legal and equitable title to the property while a license is mere permission to use. Assignment is the transfer of the whole of the interest in the right while in a license the owner retains the legal ownership of the property.”). []
  38. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a) (West 2013) (“On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.”). []
  39. See, e.g., Ted Browne Music Co. v. Fowler, 290 F. 751, 753 (2d Cir. 1923) (“The owner of the equitable title is not a mere licensee [i.e., a nonexclusive licensee], and he may sue in equity, particularly where the owner of the legal title is an infringer, or one of the infringers, thus occupying a position hostile to the plaintiff.”); Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Prior to the adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 501(b), the beneficial owner, in order to have standing to sue the infringer, was required to join the owner of the copyright as a defendant, alleging that the latter had refused after demand to sue.”); Buck v. Virgo, 22 F.Supp. 156, 157 (W.D.N.Y. 1938) (“The rights of a licensee under a copyright do not depend upon legal title. A licensee has no right to sue in his own name for infringement. The reason for the necessity of joining the owner of the copyright as plaintiff is that the owner has the legal title. This he holds in trust for the licensee.”) (internal citations omitted); Stephens v. Howells Sales Co., 16 F.2d 805, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1926) (“[A] licensee cannot bring suit for infringement of the copyright under which he holds his license in his own name; this for the reason that the copyright is, technically speaking, indivisible, the legal title remaining in the licensor and the licensee having merely an equitable title.”). []
  40. See, e.g., Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 n.2 (1949) (“Notwithstanding the fusion of law and equity by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the substantive principles of Courts of Chancery remain unaffected.”); Railex Corp. v. Joseph Guss & Sons, Inc., 40 F.R.D. 119, 123 (D.D.C 1966) (“Initially, it should be mentioned that F.R.C.P. Rule 2 abolishes only the procedural distinctions but not the substantive distinctions between law and equity. The substantive distinctions between legal and equitable rights and remedies are still applicable in the Federal Courts, particularly with regard to the constitutional right to trial by jury ‘in suits at common law’ declared by the Seventh Amendment.”). []
  41. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2013). []
  42. Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2002). []
  43. 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(d)(2) (West 2013) “Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title.”). []
  44. See, e.g., Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U.S. 205, 223 (1874) (discussing patents) (“A court of equity looks to substance rather than form. When it has jurisdiction of parties it grants the appropriate relief without regard to whether they come as plaintiff or defendant. In this case the person who should have protected the plaintiff against all infringements has become himself the infringer. He held the legal title to his patent in trust for his licensees. He has been faithless to his trust, and courts of equity are always open for the redress of such a wrong. This wrong is an infringement.”); Indep. Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 269 U.S. 459, 468-69 (1926) (discussing patents) (“If the owner of a patent, being within the jurisdiction, refuses or is unable to join an exclusive licensee as coplaintiff, the licensee may make him a party defendant by process, and he will be lined up by the court in the party character which he should assume. . . . This would seem to be in accord with general equity practice. . . . A cestui que trust may make an unwilling trustee a defendant in a suit to protect the subject of the trust.”) (internal citations omitted). []
  45. A. Brod, Inc. v. SK&I Co., L.L.C., 998 F.Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). []
  46. Id. at 318. []
  47. Id. at 320. []
  48. Id. at 325 (internal citations omitted). []
  49. See Rhone Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“In short, because of the importance of having a uniform national rule, we hold that the bona fide purchaser defense to patent infringement is a matter of federal law. Because such a federal rule implicates an issue of patent law, the law of this circuit governs the rule.”). []
Posted in Copyright Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

“To Do” vs. “To Authorize”

Cross-posted on the Copyhype blog.

On its face, the Copyright Act provides that copyright owners actually have two separate sets of rights. Section 106 of the Act gives copyright owners the exclusive rights “to do” and “to authorize” certain listed activities with their copyrighted works, including creating reproductions, making adaptations, distributing copies to the public, publicly performing them, and publicly displaying them.1 It’s clear enough what it means “to do” any of those listed activities, but what does it mean “to authorize” them? Moreover, does merely authorizing someone else to infringe lead to liability even if that party doesn’t actually infringe?

Section 501 of the Act provides that “[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner” is an infringer.2 It matters not whether they violated the exclusive right “to do” or “to authorize” the listed activity. Either way it’s infringement and they’re an infringer, subject to the full range of remedies under the Act. Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court has noted, distinguishing between different types of infringement is not always easy since “the lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn.”3

Under the 1909 Copyright Act, courts “came to mixed conclusions about how much involvement in infringing was necessary to subject a defendant to liability for an infringement.”4 The doctrinal disarray was not helped by the fact that the previous Act “did not specifically state that the copyright holder had the exclusive right to authorize use” of the copyrighted work.5 But that all changed with the addition of the right “to authorize” in the 1976 Copyright Act, which “was intended to remove the confusion surrounding contributory and vicarious infringement.”6

But can merely authorizing a listed activity itself be infringement without more? In other words, can one who authorizes an infringement be liable even if that authorized infringement never occurs? That depends on whether the exclusive right “to authorize” is seen as an independent right that stands on its own. The relevant House Report has surprisingly little to say about the newly-minted right “to authorize,” though it does suggest that the right doesn’t stand alone:

The exclusive rights accorded to a copyright owner under section 106 are ‘to do and to authorize‘ any of the activities specified in the five numbered clauses. Use of the phrase ‘to authorize’ is intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers. For example, a person who lawfully acquires an authorized copy of a motion picture would be an infringer if he or she engages in the business of renting it to others for purposes of unauthorized public performance.7

The reason it matters is because direct infringers are always liable to the copyright owner, while indirect infringers are only liable if the authorized infringement actually occurs.8 Thus, if the exclusive right “to authorize” is in fact merely a codification of existing secondary liability doctrines, then one who authorizes an infringement has no liability unless the party authorized actually infringes. On the other hand, if the exclusive right “to authorize” stands alone, then mere authorization of an infringement is itself infringement—even if the party authorized doesn’t actually infringe.

In his influential copyright treatise, Nimmer posits that a “far more perplexing question is whether direct infringement must even exist in order for third-party liability to arise.”9 He thinks that reading the Act to create liability for mere authorization without actual infringement is “overly facile,” and that “to authorize” should be seen as “simply a convenient peg on which Congress chose to hang the antecedent jurisprudence of third-party liability.”10 He concludes that “the rule should generally prevail that third party liability, as its name implies, may exist only when direct liability, i.e., infringement, is present.”11

A few district courts have disagreed with Nimmer and found that the right “to authorize” stands alone. For example, one district court stated that “Congress created a new form of ‘direct’ infringement” when the Act was amended to add the right “to authorize.”12 Another district court stated that “tying the authorization right solely to a claim of justiciable contributory infringement appears contrary both to well-reasoned precedent, statutory text, and legislative history.”13 That court held that merely authorizing infringing acts could itself constitute direct infringement.

A different district court followed suit and stated that Section 106 should be read literally to create an independent, exclusive right “to authorize” use of a copyrighted work.14 That court held that “mere authorization . . . constitutes direct infringement and is actionable under United States Copyright Law.”15 And in yet another district court, it was held that infringement commences at the moment that authorization occurs, because “the right ‘to authorize’ infringing acts” was itself “a right newly recognized by Congress.”16 But these four district courts represent the minority view, and no appellate court that I could find has ever agreed.

In fact, the appellate courts that have addressed the issue have instead agreed with Nimmer, as have the district courts that have cited them. In a leading case, the Ninth Circuit stated that “the addition of the words ‘to authorize’ in the 1976 Act appears best understood as merely clarifying that the Act contemplates liability for contributory infringement . . . .”17 The court of appeals quoted Nimmer for the proposition that Congress was merely codifying the preexisting “jurisprudence of third party liability.”18 Accordingly, the appellate court found that the authorization right is only implicated in cases of contributory infringement, i.e., where there is also direct infringement.

The First Circuit took a similar tack while addressing the issue of whether authorization is infringement “where there is no adequate proof that the third party ever undertook an infringing act.”19 The court of appeals noted that “most (perhaps all) courts that have considered the question have taken the view that a listed infringing act (beyond authorization) is required for a claim.”20 While acknowledging that “the better bare-language reading would allow” a claim for mere authorization, the appellate court nonetheless held that there must be proof “of an infringing act after the authorization.”21

The district court in the famous Jammie Thomas-Rasset case considered whether merely “making available” song files in a peer-to-peer share folder violated plaintiffs’ exclusive right “to authorize” distributions. (This was in addition to its consideration of whether Thomas-Rasset violated plaintiffs’ exclusive right “to do” distributions, as I wrote about previously.) After surveying the statutory text, case law, and legislative history, the district court concluded that “the authorization clause merely provides a statutory foundation for secondary liability, not a means of expanding the scope of direct infringement liability.”22 Moreover, said the district court, “the authorization right . . . only applies if there is an actual dissemination.”23

Bringing us back to the Copyright Act, it’s safe to say that while the plain wording of Section 106 appears to create an independent, exclusive right “to authorize” the listed activities, the majority view is that the right “to authorize” doesn’t stand alone and that one who authorizes an infringement is only liable if the authorized infringement actually takes place.

Follow me on Twitter: @devlinhartline

  1. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2012) (“the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”). []
  2. 17 U.S.C.A. § 501 (West 2012). []
  3. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435, n.17 (1984) (internal quotations omitted). []
  4. Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Cont’l Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986). []
  5. Id. (emphasis in original). []
  6. Id. []
  7. H.R. REP. 94-1476, 61. []
  8. See, e.g., 1 Goldstein, Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice § 6.1, at 705 (1989) (“It is definitional that, for a defendant to be held contributorily . . . liable, a direct infringement must have occurred.”). []
  9. 3-12 Nimmer on Copyright § 12.04[D][1]. []
  10. Id. []
  11. Id. []
  12. ITSI T.V. Productions, Inc. v. California Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F.Supp. 854, 860 (E.D. Cal. 1992). []
  13. Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 594 (M.D. Tenn. 1995). []
  14. Expediters Int’l of Washington, Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Mgmt. Services, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 468, 476 (D.N.J. 1998). []
  15. Id. at 477. []
  16. Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Products, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 237, 241 (W.D.N.C. 1987). []
  17. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 1994). []
  18. Id. (internal quotations and brackets omitted). []
  19. Venegas-Hernandez v. ACEMLA, 424 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2005). []
  20. Id. at 57. []
  21. Id. at 59. []
  22. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F.Supp.2d 1210, 1221 (D. Minn. 2008). []
  23. Id. at 1223. []
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Nimmer Changes His Tune: “Making Available” is Distribution

Cross-posted on the Copyhype blog.

One topic of debate in copyright is over whether simply “making available” a file on a peer-to-peer network is itself a violation of the distribution right.1 The courts have been split on the issue.2 Professor Peter S. Menell explains the controversy:

Interpreting “distribute” narrowly, some courts have held that copyright owners must prove that a sound recording placed in a share folder was actually downloaded to establish violation of the distribution right. Other courts held that merely making a sound recording available violates the distribution right. The ramifications for copyright enforcement in the Internet age are substantial. Under the narrow interpretation, the relative anonymity of Internet transmissions in combination with privacy concerns make enforcement costly and difficult. A broad interpretation exposes millions of file-sharers to potentially crushing statutory damages.3

The popular copyright treatise Nimmer on Copyright has played an important role in the debate. The treatise was first published in 1963 by the late Professor Melville Nimmer. Since 1985, his son Professor David Nimmer (“Nimmer”) has taken over the task of editing and updating it. It’s hard to exaggerate how influential Nimmer on Copyright has been in shaping copyright jurisprudence. A quick, informal search on Westlaw turns up 3,301 state and federal cases that have cited it. That is compared to 1,444 cites for Goldstein on Copyright and 236 cites for Patry on Copyright, two other leading copyright treatises.

Several courts have consulted Nimmer on Copyright when analyzing whether “making available” constitutes distribution. As recently as 2011, the treatise took the position that infringement of the distribution right requires actual dissemination of copies of a work to the public.4 But in the latest edition, Nimmer has changed his tune—the treatise now states that “making available” is distribution simpliciter. After a detailed examination of the legislative history of the current Copyright Act, Nimmer now concludes that “the distribution right was formulated precisely so that it would extend to making copyrighted works available, rather than mandating proof of actual activities of distribution.”5

Thomas-Rasset and “Making Available”

The “making available” issue took center stage in the famous Jammie Thomas-Rasset case. In 2006, certain recording companies sued Thomas-Rasset for willful copyright infringement. One of the claims was that she had violated the distribution right by merely “making available” twenty-four copyrighted song files on the KaZaA peer-to-peer network. An investigator working for the plaintiffs found that the song files were available in a KaZaA share folder for others to download, but it could not be determined whether other users had in fact downloaded the files.

The district court instructed the jury that the “act of making copyrighted sound recordings available for electronic distribution on a peer-to-peer network, without license from the copyright owners, violates the copyright owners’ exclusive right of distribution, regardless of whether actual distribution has been shown.”6 The jury found Thomas-Rasset liable for willful copyright infringement, awarding the plaintiffs statutory damages of $9,250 per song, for a total of $222,000. The next day, the court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict.

Thomas-Rasset then moved for new trial, or in the alternative, for remittitur. Months later, the district court sua sponte asked the parties to submit briefs on the issue of whether its jury instruction on “making available” was a manifest error of law. Several amici, including the EFF, Public Knowledge, and the MPAA, were permitted to file briefs as well. The plaintiffs and their supporters argued that the jury instruction on “making available” was proper, while Thomas-Rasset and her supporters argued that “making available” is not distribution. After thorough analysis, the district court sided with Thomas-Rasset.

The district court noted that while the Eighth Circuit had not addressed the “making available” issue in the peer-to-peer context, the court of appeals had nonetheless considered and rejected the “making available” argument in a different context in National Car.7 In that case, the appellate court grappled with the issue of whether a state law claim for breach of contract was preempted by the Copyright Act. The district court below had held that a licensee’s unauthorized use of licensed software to process third-party data was equivalent to distribution of copies of that software.

The Eighth Circuit rejected the notion that use of a software program for the benefit of third parties constituted distribution of the software. The court of appeals turned to Nimmer’s treatise for the proposition that the distribution right “grants the copyright owner the exclusive right publicly to sell, give away, rent or lend any material embodiment of his work.”8 It concluded that “even with respect to computer software, the distribution right is only the right to distribute copies of the work. As Professor Nimmer has stated, infringement of the distribution right requires an actual dissemination of either copies or phonorecords.”9

Finding that the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in National Car was binding precedent, the district court in the Thomas-Rasset case held that liability “for violation of the exclusive distribution right . . . requires actual dissemination.”10 The district court then granted Thomas-Rasset’s motion for a new trial on the ground that the jury instruction on the “making available” issue was legal error that substantially prejudiced her rights. The new trial was of no help to Thomas-Rasset. Even without the “making available” instruction, the jury again found her liable for willful copyright infringement of the twenty-four song files.

The Thomas-Rasset story demonstrates nicely the influence that Nimmer on Copyright has had in the “making available” debate. The Eighth Circuit in National Car relied on the treatise in finding that violation of the distribution right requires actual dissemination of copies of a work to the public. In turn, the district court in the Thomas-Rasset case followed suit in concluding that merely “making available” a work on a peer-to-peer network does not violate the distribution right. But what’s to be made of the fact that Nimmer has now changed his tune on the “making available” issue?

Nimmer’s New Tune

In his recent journal article, Professor Peter S. Menell (“Menell”) surveys the voluminous legislative history leading up the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, and he shows that Congress did in fact intend to establish that “making available” is distribution. Menell examines the significant errors in interpreting the scope of the distribution right made in the treatises, scholarship, and court decisions. And then in a footnote, he mentions that he was able convince Nimmer to change his tune:

The discussion that follows is based upon the version of Nimmer on Copyright that was available to jurists and practitioners through August 2011. After reading this article, Professor Nimmer asked me to co-author a complete revision of the sections of Nimmer on Copyright relating to the scope of the distribution right and the definition of “publication.”11

The latest edition of Nimmer’s treatise does indeed adopt Menell’s findings on the “making available” issue. (Relatedly, Menell and Nimmer have created two multimedia presentations of their discoveries that I highly recommend: Part I: In Search of the Lost Ark and Part II: The Elephant in the Room.) Nimmer on Copyright now notes that the courts that have looked at the “making available” puzzle have all failed to consider the relevant evidence of Congress’s intent:

The point of commonality among these opinions is that none of them went back to examine the rich trove of legislative materials from the early to mid 1960s and early 1970s explicating Congress’s intent in shifting terminology from the 1909 rights to publish and vend to the 1976 Act’s right to “distribute,” and at the same time expanding the definition “publication” to include offers to distribute.12

Under the 1909 Copyright Act, there was no right to distribute. Instead, copyright owners had the rights to publish and to vend. The right to publish was universally understood to encompass all public offerings of a work, i.e., “making available” copies of a work to the public. Nimmer observes that no court “recognized a requirement to prove actual distribution of copies, and even gratuitous offers of a work to the public fell within the right to publish.”13 That “making available” copies of a work to the public constituted publication was well-settled at the time the revisions for the modern Copyright Act were considered.

Determination of what constituted publication under the 1909 Act was of critical importance because a work was deemed to have lost its common law copyright protection the moment it was published. Moreover, if a work was published without the obligatory copyright notice, that work fell into the public domain and received no statutory copyright protection. Since the penalty for publishing a work without copyright notice was so harsh, judges advanced some questionable distinctions into the jurisprudence. The drafters of the 1976 Act introduced the right to distribute in an attempt to shed these dubious vestiges.

Nimmer explains:

The drafters of the current Act wished to avoid the tremendous accumulation of common law interpretation that had thus arisen over how to define “publication.” For that reason, they chose a new term, “distribution,” as an omnibus term that would encompass all acts then qualifying as “publication,” without the technical exceptions that had accreted through the common law process of various rulings.14

Thus, the introduction of the right to distribute in the 1976 Act was intended not only to incorporate the preexisting publication right, which included “making available” copies of a work to the public, but it was also intended to broaden the publication right by eliminating the problematic exceptions that had been introduced into the doctrine by the judiciary.

As Nimmer summarizes:

The distribution right accorded by Section 106(3) is to be interpreted broadly, consonant with the intention expressed by its drafters. It extends to the offer to the general public to make a work available for distribution without permission of the copyright owner. No consummated act of actual distribution need be demonstrated in order to implicate the copyright owner’s distribution right.15

So under Nimmer’s contemporary analysis, the district court in the Thomas-Rasset case had it wrong when it concluded that nowhere in the legislative history does “Congress state that distribution should be given the same broad meaning as publication.”16 Not only did Congress intend that distributions should encompass all publications, the new distribution right was specifically created to be broader than the antecedent publication right. Similarly, the district court in the Thomas-Rasset case had it backwards when it held that “all distributions to the public are publications, but not all publications are distributions to the public.”17

Given the widespread influence of his treatise, it seems inevitable that others will follow Nimmer in his conclusion that “the act of making available sound recordings for downloading by the public through file-sharing networks suffices to show actionable copyright infringement.”18 But only time will tell how many others change their tunes as well.

Follow me on Twitter: @devlinhartline

  1. 17 U.S.C.S. § 106(3) (Lexis 2012) (“the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: *** (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”). []
  2. See, e.g., Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F.Supp.2d 976 (D. Ariz. 2008); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F.Supp.2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008); Motown Record Co., LP v. DePietro, No. 04-cv-2246, 2007 WL 576284 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007); Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Payne, No. 06-ca-051, 2006 WL 2844415 (W.D. Tex. July 17, 2006); Atl. Recording Corp. v. Anderson, No. 06-cv-3578, 2008 WL 2316551 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2008); Universal City Studios Productions LLLP v. Bigwood, 441 F.Supp.2d 185 (D. Me. 2006); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Alburger, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91585 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2009). []
  3. Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 1 (2011). []
  4. Nimmer on Copyright § 8.11[A], at 8-149 (2007) (“Infringement of [the distribution right] requires an actual dissemination of either copies or phonorecords.”). []
  5. 2-8 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.11[D][4][c]. []
  6. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F.Supp.2d 1210, 1213 (D. Minn. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). []
  7. National Car Rental Sys. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993). []
  8. Id. at 430 (quoting 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.11[A], at 8-123) (emphasis in original; internal quotations omitted). []
  9. Id. at 434 (quoting 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.11[A], at 8-124.1) (emphasis in original; internal quotations and brackets omitted). []
  10. Thomas, 579 F.Supp.2d at 1226. []
  11. Menell, 59 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. at 20 n.90. []
  12. 2-8 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.11[D][1]. []
  13. 2-8 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.11[B][4][d] (emphasis in original). []
  14. 2-8 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.11[A]. []
  15. 2-8 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.11[B][4][d]. []
  16. Thomas, 579 F.Supp.2d at 1219. []
  17. Id. at 1220. []
  18. 2-8 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.11[D][4][c]. []
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Twitter’s Potential Secondary Liability

Cross-posted on the Copyhype blog.

Last week, Seattle-based photographer Christopher Boffoli sued Twitter in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington for contributory copyright infringement. Boffoli is well-known for his “Disparity Series,” which according to the complaint is “a series of art photographs featuring miniature figures in whimsical poses on fruit.” Seattle Magazine has a brief article about the series. Boffoli’s case was also a topic of discussion on the most recent episode of “This Week in Law” (where Terry Hart was a guest).

In the complaint, Boffoli alleges that Twitter users uploaded several of his copyrighted photographs without license or permission and then linked to them in various tweets. Some images were hosted on Twitter’s own servers, while others were hosted on servers operated by third-parties. Boffoli claims that even though he sent four DMCA takedown notices to Twitter’s registered agent for receiving such notices, none of the hosted links or images were removed.

As such, Boffoli alleges that Twitter is liable for willful contributory infringement because (1) it had actual knowledge of infringement provided by his DMCA takedown notices, and (2) it materially contributed to the underlying infringements by Twitter’s users.

Ars Technica and Techdirt ran articles about the lawsuit last week. Both pointed out that Twitter’s failure to respond to the DMCA takedown notices doesn’t necessarily mean that the service provider is liable for infringement. That much is true, but it was also suggested in both articles that Twitter wasn’t likely to be liable for infringement despite its failure to remove the links and images complained of. It’s that notion that I’ll examine more closely.

DMCA Notice-and-Takedown

The DMCA1 notice-and-takedown provisions are no doubt familiar. Title II of the DMCA, titled the “Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act,” created Section 5122 of the Copyright Act—what people often are referring to when they talk about the “DMCA,” even though it’s only one part. It’s here that the notice-and-takedown provisions are found. The idea is simple: A copyright owner who finds infringing material on a service provider’s system sends notice to the service provider who then takes it down.

The “DMCA did not simply rewrite copyright law for the on-line world,” but rather, “it crafted a number of safe harbors which insulate ISPs from most liability should they be accused of violating traditional copyright law.”3 The DMCA uses a classic carrot-and-stick approach to get service providers to play along. The carrot of limited liability within the safe harbors is enforced by the stick of full liability without. This “preserves strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked environment.”4

When a third-party user stores material on a service provider’s system, the provider’s potential copyright liability is greatly reduced if it “responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to,” the material upon notice that it “is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.”5 Thus, to moor in the safe harbors, a service provider must quickly take down allegedly infringing material when notified. Once in the safe harbors, a service provider is only potentially liable for limited injunctive relief—it’s not potentially liable for monetary relief as it would be otherwise.

A common misperception is in thinking that a service provider that qualifies for the safe harbors cannot be liable for infringement. The DMCA itself is irrelevant to determining whether the service provider is an infringer. The safe harbors limit liability, but they “do not affect the question of ultimate liability under the various doctrines of direct, vicarious, and contributory” infringement.6 After it’s determined that a service provider is an infringer in the first place, the safe harbors can be used to assess the extent of the liability. Although as a practical matter, courts usually start with the analysis of the safe harbors first.7

Nor does the fact that a service provider fails to qualify for the safe harbors necessarily mean that it is liable for infringement. Such a service provider “is still entitled to all other arguments under the law—whether by way of an affirmative defense or through an argument that conduct simply does not constitute a prima facie case of infringement under the Copyright Act.”8 This make sense because the material complained of may not even be infringing or the service provider may qualify for some defense. Just because its liability isn’t limited by the safe harbors, it doesn’t mean that the service provider is liable in the first place.

Immunity under the safe harbors is not presumptive, and it’s only granted to service providers who do not have knowledge, either actual or constructive, of infringement. The “DMCA’s protection of an innocent service provider disappears at the moment the service provider loses its innocence, i.e., at the moment it becomes aware that a third party is using its system to infringe.”9 One common way to alert a service provider of infringement is via a takedown notice, which is effective only if it “includes substantially” certain elements listed in the statute.10

Contributory Infringement

With “roots in the tort-law concepts of enterprise liability and imputed intent,” contributory infringement is a type of secondary copyright liability.11 It follows from the common law doctrine that “one who knowingly participates in or furthers a tortious act is jointly and severally liable with the prime tortfeasor,” a concept that applies in copyright law as it does in numerous other areas of the law.12 Put simply, contributory infringement is the idea that a person who contributes to the infringement of another is held liable for the infringement they helped to bring about.

The courts have formulated different tests for contributory infringement, but they all share the same basic elements. The test in the Ninth Circuit, where Boffoli filed his suit against Twitter, is simple: “one contributorily infringes when he (1) has knowledge of another’s infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b) induces that infringement.”13 Inducement infringement, identified by the Supreme Court in the Grokster opinion,14 is not at issue here. Boffoli is claiming traditional contributory infringement, which has two elements: (1) knowledge, and (2) material contribution.

As to the knowledge element, contributory infringement “requires that the secondary infringer know or have reason to know of direct infringement.”15 In other words, either actual or constructive knowledge will suffice. It’s not enough that a service provider merely supplies the means of accomplishing infringement.16 Instead, there must be knowledge of “specific information which identifies infringing activity” before liability attaches.17 This makes sense because without specific knowledge, a service provider wouldn’t know what items to remove to avoid liability.

The relationship between knowledge and intent should also be noted. An explicit finding of intent is not “necessary to support liability for contributory copyright infringement.”18 Under the “rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law,”19 the “intention to cause the natural and probable consequences” of one’s conduct may be imputed.20 It’s not mandatory to find that a service provider actually intended to contribute to the underlying infringement. Instead, a “knowing failure to prevent infringing actions” can be the basis for imposing contributory liability.21

Generally speaking, the material contribution element “turns on whether the activity in question substantially assists direct infringement.”22 In the internet context, the Ninth Circuit last year held that there “is no question that providing direct infringers with server space satisfies” this standard because it is “an essential step in the infringement process.”23 The alleged material contribution must have a direct connection to the infringement such that it assists or enables internet users to locate infringing content.24

In the famous Napster case, the Ninth Circuit held that “if a computer system operator learns of specific infringing material available on his system and fails to purge such material from the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement.”25 The appellate court concluded that “Napster materially contributes to the infringing activity,” since without its help, “Napster users could not find and download the music they want” as easily.26 To impose contributory liability, it was enough that “Napster provides the site and facilities for direct infringement.”27

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 stated that “a computer system operator can be held contributorily liable if it has actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its system and can take simple measures to prevent further damage to copyrighted works yet continues to provide access to infringing works.”28 The court of appeals held that “Google could be held contributorily liable if it had knowledge that infringing . . . images were available using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent further damage to [plaintiff’s] copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps.”29

Putting it all together, I think Boffoli has a good chance of success on the merits of his claim. If he sent DMCA takedown notices to Twitter that complied substantially with the elements listed in the statute, then Twitter will have lost its innocence and will be deemed to have knowledge of the infringement (should there actually be any). Once knowledge is established, Twitter’s intent to cause the infringement will be imputed. And as to material contribution, Twitter is assisting and enabling its users to find the infringing content it provides on its system.

This is similar to the situation in Napster, where the Ninth Circuit held that Napster could be liable as a contributory infringer for failing to remove material it knew to be infringing. This is also similar to the circumstances in Perfect 10, where the Ninth Circuit held that Google could be liable as a contributory infringer for failing to remove links to infringing images once alerted to their presence. Here, Twitter is failing to remove both links and images.

That said, it’s kind of hard to understand why Twitter hasn’t removed the links and images Boffoli complained of. Perhaps there’s more going on here than meets the eye, but under the allegations in the complaint, it seems to me that Twitter could be contributorily liable for whatever infringement is taking place of Boffoli’s copyrighted images.

Follow me on Twitter: @devlinhartline

  1. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub.L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and at 28 U.S.C. § 4001). []
  2. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West 2012); Section 512 codified the principles developed by the district court in Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Services, Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). []
  3. Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F.Supp.2d 1051, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2002). []
  4. H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-796, 72 (1998). []
  5. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(C) (West 2012) (“A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider– *** upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.”). []
  6. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002). []
  7. See, e.g., Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F.Supp.2d 688, 699 (D. Md. 2001) (“The existence of the safe harbor convolutes the analysis of copyright infringement which, theoretically, should proceed in a straight line. Ideally, CoStar would have to make a prima facie showing that LoopNet was liable of contributory infringement and then the court would turn to the question of whether the “safe harbor” provided a defense. However, because the parameters of the liability protection provided by the “safe harbor” are not contiguous with the bounds of liability for contributory infringement, the analysis may proceed more efficiently if issues are decided a bit out of order. On summary judgment, it is often appropriate for a court to decide issues out of the traditional order because a dispute of fact is only material if it can affect the outcome of a proceeding. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Thus, to the extent, if at all, that LoopNet is entitled to summary judgment in its safe harbor defense, all other issues concerning damages liability for contributory infringement would be rendered immaterial.”). []
  8. CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 552 (4th Cir. 2004). []
  9. ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001). []
  10. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3)(A) (West 2012) (“To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed infringement must be a written communication provided to the designated agent of a service provider that includes substantially the following: (i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site. (iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material. (iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted. (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.”). []
  11. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 795 (9th Cir. 2007). []
  12. 1 Niel Boorstyn, Boorstyn On Copyright § 10.06[2], at 10-21 (1994). []
  13. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 795; it should be noted too that contributory infringement requires direct infringement to have occurred before liability attaches; see 1 Goldstein, Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice § 6.1, at 705 (1989) (“It is definitional that, for a defendant to be held contributorily . . . liable, a direct infringement must have occurred.”). []
  14. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (the Court held that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”). []
  15. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). []
  16. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 436 (1984). []
  17. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021. []
  18. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 943 (9th Cir. 2011). []
  19. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934-35. []
  20. DeVoto v. Pac. Fid. Life Ins. Co., 618 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965) (“All consequences which the actor desires to bring about are intended, as the word is used in this Restatement. Intent is not, however, limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.”). []
  21. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007). []
  22. Louis Vuitton, 658 F.3d at 943 (internal quotations omitted). []
  23. Id. (internal quotations omitted). []
  24. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 797. []
  25. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021. []
  26. Id. at 1022. []
  27. Id. []
  28. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1172 (internal quotations and citations omitted). []
  29. Id. []
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